

# The Classical Weekly

Published on Monday, October 1 to May 31, except in weeks in which there is a legal or school holiday (Columbus Day, Election Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas, New Year's Day, Lincoln's Birthday, Washington's Birthday, Easter Sunday, Decoration Day). A volume usually contains twenty-six or twenty-seven issues.

Owner and Publisher, The Classical Association of the Atlantic States.

Place of publication, Barnard College, New York, New York.  
Editor, Charles Knapp (Barnard College, Columbia University).  
Address, 1737 Sedgwick Avenue, New York, New York.

VOLUME XXIX, No. 8

MONDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1935

WHOLE No. 780

## ANCIENT RHETORIC IN THE MODERN COLLEGE COURSE IN SPEECH<sup>1</sup>

In a recent note, Tacitus on Changes of Style in Public Speaking (THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 28.112) Professor Henry C. Montgomery raises a point which, it seems to me, calls for further discussion. With the observation of Tacitus (Dialogus De Oratoribus 1) on the disregard in which the earlier masters of oratory were then held he aptly compares the modern distaste for formal oratory and all things connected with it. "Even the nomenclature has changed", Professor Montgomery says; he calls to witness the fact that fifty years ago the members of a College faculty who were entrusted with the instruction of youth in the accurate and effective use of language were known as Instructors in Rhetoric or Oratory, whereas to-day the corresponding teachers are styled Professors of Speech.

This is, indeed, an undeniable fact. On the other hand, I believe that an examination of the *material* actually taught in the modern classes in Speech would reveal that in many respects it is very much the same as it was, not only fifty years ago in collegiate courses in Rhetoric, but also in the days of Quintilian or Cicero or Aristotle. Moreover, there still are institutions, such as the Jesuit Schools, in which the study of Rhetoric (not Speech) is proudly and thoroughly based on ancient precept and practice<sup>2a</sup>. The truth of the matter is, not that *even* the nomenclature has changed, but rather that, while names have changed, the thing itself is still the same. Let me quote from Professor Baldwin<sup>2</sup>:

The only art of composition that concerns the mass of mankind, and is therefore universal in both educational practise and critical theory, is the art of effective communication by speaking and writing. This is what the ancients and most moderns call rhetoric. . . .

A convenient illustration is furnished by the outline for the "organization of material" for written and oral speeches which is taught to the Freshmen at Allegheny College, under the direction of Professor Anderson<sup>3</sup>. This is, in very brief form, as follows:

<sup>1</sup>This paper was read at the Twenty-eighth Annual Meeting of The Classical Association of the Atlantic States, held at Lafayette College, Easton, Pennsylvania, April 26-27, 1935.

<sup>2</sup>Side by side with this paper the reader should study the paper entitled The Technique of Emotional Appeal in Cicero's Judicial Speeches, by Professor Harry J. Leon, THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 29.33-38. C. K. >.

<sup>2a</sup>See the excellent books of the Rev. Francis P. Donnelly, S. J.: Persuasive Speech (New York, Kenedy, 1931), and Principles of Jesuit Education in Practice (New York, Kenedy, 1934).

<sup>3</sup>Charles S. Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, 6 (New York, Macmillan, 1924). <For a review, by Professor George C. Fiske, of this work see THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY 19.62-63. C. K. >.

<sup>3</sup>The Manual in Oral and Written English, prepared by Professor Hurst B. Anderson, consists chiefly of duplicates of this outline, with directions for its use. Copies of the Manual may be procured from the Allegheny College Book Store, Meadville, Pennsylvania.

A. Introduction: (1) To secure good-will; (2) To secure attention; (3) To prepare audience; (4) To suggest speech purpose.

B. Body. This is subdivided, by means of parallel columns, into (1) Outline, (2) Illustrations, Examples, etc., (3) Facts, Authority, etc.

C. Conclusion: (1) To round out thought; (2) To summarize; (3) To appeal to basic wants.

Now, this can be demonstrated to be very similar to the order of the parts (*dispositio*) of a speech as laid down by the ancient rhetoricians. In the following discussion I have attempted to summarize and reduce to conformity the directions concerning this topic that are given in five ancient treatises: (1) the *Ars Rhetorica* of Aristotle, (2) the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, by an unknown Roman teacher of about 85 B. C., (3) the early handbook of Cicero, *De Inventione*, (4) Cicero's later sketch, *Partitiones Oratoriae*, and (5) the *Institutio Oratoria* of Quintilian.

Aristotle (3.13.4) says that the necessary parts of every speech are the statement of the case (*πρόθεσις*) and the proof (*πίστις*), although in some speeches he admits a four-fold division, prefixing to these two an introduction (*προοίμιον*) and adding a conclusion (*ἐπιλογος*). Without attempting to point out here more than a surface resemblance between the two, I remark that the modern three-fold division appears to omit the *πρόθεσις* of Aristotle. A closer inspection, to be undertaken below, will show that the *πρόθεσις* is not really omitted, but is included by Professor Anderson (see note 3, above) as the fourth subhead of his Introduction. This is not in itself particularly striking. An examination of what the Latin handbooks on rhetoric have to say under the topic of *dispositio* is more illuminating.

The Auctor ad Herennium (1.4) asserts that there are six main parts of a speech: *exordium*, *narratio*, *divisio*, *confirmatio*, *confutatio*, *conclusio*. Cicero, in his youthful treatise *De Inventione* (1.19), lays down the same six divisions (with a slight change in nomenclature, be it noted): *exordium*, *narratio*, *partitio*, *confirmatio*, *reprehensio*, *conclusio*. Quintilian (3.9.1) reduces them to five: *prooemium*, *narratio*, *probatio*, *refutatio*, *peroratio*. He shows, with much justice, that the method of the *partitio* (enumeration of points to be covered) might be followed in any part of the speech, and that therefore the *partitio* is not to be regarded as a complete division in itself. If it may further be assumed that the *confirmatio* and the *refutatio* of the Romans, when they are taken together, are merely two parts of Aristotle's general

heading *πρόσ*<sup>4</sup>, then there is general agreement that there are only four essential parts of a speech: *exordium* or *prooemium*, *narratio*, *confirmatio*, *conclusio*. This is exactly the position assumed by Cicero in his later manual, *Partitiones Oratoriae*<sup>5</sup>. The Roman rhetoricians agree with Aristotle, assuming that *narratio* is the same as *πρόθεσις* and Aristotle (I invert the chronology) agrees with Professor Anderson's outline.

The only point that remains to be settled is the equivalence of the Roman *narratio* with the *πρόθεσις* of Aristotle. *Narratio* is a translation of *διήγησις*, which, Aristotle admitted (3.13.3), was generally accepted in his time as a full part of the division. He objected to it as a term on the grounds that a full and detailed 'rehearsal' (*διήγησις*) of antecedent events was proper only to forensic speeches (*λόγοι δικάσιμοι*, *genus iudiciale*), and that his own term *πρόθεσις*, 'statement of the facts', was applicable also to epideictic and demonstrative speeches<sup>6</sup>. But the problem is, once more, merely a matter of nomenclature, for the Romans recognized clearly enough that *narratio* was essentially a statement of the facts of the case, and that actual narration was not to be used in all types of speeches<sup>7</sup>.

The most interesting part of the evidence, however, is to be found in a comparison of Roman theory with Professor Anderson's outline for the Conclusion and especially for the Introduction. On the purpose of the *exordium* there is universal agreement. This is well stated by Quintilian (4.1.5): 'The reason for a beginning is merely to induce the audience to be more ready to hear us in the rest of the speech. This can best be done by three things, as almost all authorities agree—if we render the audience *well-disposed, attentive, tractable*'<sup>8</sup>. Now, these three aims of the *exordium* are exactly the first three points in Professor Anderson's Introduction, where they are given in Quintilian's order: (1) To secure good-will, (2) To secure attention, (3) To prepare the audience. The first two points require no comment. The third is explained by the Auctor ad Herennium (1.7): 'We shall be able to render the audience tractable, if we briefly give the substance of the case'<sup>9</sup>.

<sup>4</sup>Aristotle (3.13.4) mentions refutation as a part of the proofs: *τὰ γὰρ πρὸς τὸν ἀντιδίκον τῶν πιστεῶν ἐστὶ*. The Auctor ad Herennium gives no separate treatment to *confirmatio* and *confutatio*, but discusses them together. He shows clearly (1.18) that he regards them as the main body of the speech: *Tota spes vincendi ratioque persuadendi posita est in confirmatione et in confutatione*. Nam cum adiumenta nostra exposuerimus contrariaque dissolverimus, absolute nimirum munus oratorum confecerimus.

<sup>5</sup>He names them thus (4): *principium, narratio, confirmatio, peroratio*. He explains his synthesis (33): *C.—Nempe ea sequuntur quae ad faciendam fidem pertinent. P.—Ita est: quae quidem in confirmationem et in reprehensionem dividuntur*.

<sup>6</sup>See John H. Freese, *The "Art" of Rhetoric of Aristotle*, 424, note (The Loeb Classical Library, 1926).

<sup>7</sup>The Auctor ad Herennium (1.17) thus defines *narratio*: *Primum [per narrationem] debemus aperire quid nobis conveniat cum adversariis, quid in controversia sit*. The text cited in the preceding sentence is that of Wilhelm Friedrich, *M. Tulli Ciceronis Opera Rhetorica*, 1 (Leipzig, Teubner, 1893). Quintilian says (4.2.1): *Maxime naturale est et fieri frequentissime debet, ut, praeparato per haec quae supra dicta sunt iudice, res, de qua pronuntiaturus est, indicetur*. Haec est *narratio*.

<sup>8</sup>*Benivolus, attentus, docilis*. Cicero, *De Inventione* 1.20, agrees with this completely; in *Partitiones Oratoriae* 28 he varies the form of his expression and the order: *ut amice, ut intelligenter, ut attente audiatur*. The Auctor ad Herennium 1.6 uses the same words in a different order: *ut attentus, ut dociles, ut benivolos auditores habere possimus*.

<sup>9</sup>*Dociles auditores habere poterimus, si summam causae [brevisiter] exponemus*. Again I cite Friedrich's text (see note 7, above). The meaning of the term *docilis* is explained with admirable lucidity and scholarship by the Rev. Francis P. Donnelly, S. J., *A Function of the Classical Exordium*, *THE CLASSICAL WEEKLY* 5.204-207.

But Professor Anderson's Introduction has a fourth subhead: To suggest speech purpose. This, it is now possible to show, is nothing more than the *narratio* of the Romans or the *πρόθεσις* of Aristotle. Quintilian (4.2.1, cited in note 7, above) defines *narratio* simply as the statement to the *iudex* of the points on which he must come to a decision, i.e. the points which the speaker will attempt to prove. This should come immediately after the *iudex* has been put in the proper frame of mind by the Introduction. Indeed, Quintilian himself has some doubt as to whether the *narratio* is not better included as a subhead under the *prooemium*, and discusses this question at some length (4.2.24-30).

I come now to the Conclusion. Professor Anderson's outline recognizes three functions of the Conclusion: (1) To round out thought, (2) To summarize, (3) To appeal to basic wants. The lore of the Roman rhetoricians is somewhat different here. They all recognize the need of a summary (*enumeratio*). All (except Cicero, in *Partitiones Oratoriae* 52) put it first. Cicero, however, follows Aristotle (3.19.1) in reserving the summary for the very end. The other function of the Conclusion was to arouse the emotions (*affectus*)<sup>10</sup>. No reader of ancient oratory can fail to feel the stress laid by the orators upon an appeal to the emotions. Except for Cicero's later treatise, all the Roman manuals make this the final and most emphatic point. The first two of these even distinguish appeal to two separate emotions, anger or indignation, and pity<sup>11</sup>. This is surely the purpose of Professor Anderson's category, "appeal to basic wants".

The problem of the first point, however, is impossible to solve in terms of the ancient rhetoricians. "To round out thought" is not the ancient *amplificatio* (*Rhetorica ad Herennium* 2.47; Cicero, *Partitiones Oratoriae* 52), which is rather a stronger statement of certain facts for the sake of arousing indignation. Nor is it the *αἰξήσις* of Aristotle (3.19.1, 2.18.4-2.19.27), exaggeration for the sake of intellectual conviction, not emotion. Perhaps we may best assume that, just as the formal beginning (to suggest speech purpose) of the main body of the speech was included as the last point in the Introduction, so, in the first point of the Conclusion, we have a formal close to the argument, bringing all its points to a full stop<sup>12</sup>.

It is thus evident that, except for a few minor alterations, the directions given to the college freshman today for the arrangement of his speeches are exactly the same, both in general and in particular, as the lore on the same points to be found in the classical rhetoricians. Now, this similarity is not to be attributed to any con-

<sup>10</sup>Quintilian 6.1.1, 9. Aristotle (3.19.1, 3) states this clearly: *εἰς τὰ πάθη τὸν ἀκροατὴν καταστήσαι*.

<sup>11</sup>See *Rhetorica ad Herennium* 2.47-50, and, for a clearer statement, Cicero, *De Inventione* 1.100 *Indignatio est oratio per quam conficitur ut in aliquem hominem magnum odium aut in rem gravis offensio concitetur*, and 106, *Conquestio est oratio auditorum misericordiam captans*.

<sup>12</sup>Professor Anderson (see note 3, above), to whom my thanks are due for his helpful criticisms, confirms my interpretation here. In his Outline, he would stress the functional rather than the categorical aspect. Hence it might often happen that the speaker would be obliged to omit or to combine various points, or to change their order. Accordingly, the first function of the Conclusion, before a detailed summary is begun, is to intimate in general terms that the end has actually been reached, in other words, "to round out the thought".

scious imitation of the ancients on the part of the moderns<sup>13</sup>, but rather, I suspect, to two things. First, college courses in rhetoric fifty years ago would have been based very closely on the work of the classical rhetoricians. Their lore would have become a part of the modern tradition of rhetoric<sup>14</sup>. Secondly, modern emphasis on the practice of speaking<sup>15</sup> would have rediscovered certain principles grasped long ago by the ancients, and thus the modern (but traditional) theory might be modified where it became too rigid. In either case, we should recognize that, while the nomenclature of modern rhetoric may be altered, the matter itself is still the same.

However, there has indeed been a change in nomenclature, testifying, no doubt, to the desire on the part of modern educators to get away from the connotation of such exceedingly classical words as rhetoric or oratory. Insofar as the teaching of those subjects fifty years ago tended to become traditional, unimaginative, cut-and-dried, it was bound to create a reaction against the classical sources from which it drew its substance. This is a great pity, for modern teachers of speech might still find much to learn from the ancients, themselves no mean practitioners in the art of speaking. One should always remember that, at a time when facilities for the distribution of the written word were so infinitely more restricted than they are at present, there was a correspondingly greater emphasis on the use of the spoken word and likewise a greater effectiveness in that use. Insofar also as the vast increase in the numbers of those seeking an advanced education brought about a diminution in the amount of formal knowledge of language which the students might be expected to possess, it was natural and necessary that some practical effort be made to close the gap between the old theoretical course in rhetoric or logic, based on *written* composition, and the earnest desire of students clamoring for a mastery of the principles of good usage, for practice in public speaking, and for an elementary knowledge of rhetorical theory. If classical rhetoric refused to demean itself to that level, to be concerned with matters of grammar and diction, then a new Department of Speech must take its place. Its program and its nomenclature were designed to avoid the forbidding aspects of a classicism too remote from the needs of the students or too difficult for their interests. But, at the same time, its theory and many parts of its actual material were bound to remain pretty much what they have always been.

I should say that the moral of all this is to be found in the words of the Auctor ad Herennium (1.1): *nam illi, ne parum multa scisse viderentur, ea conquisiverunt quae nihil attinebant, ut ars difficilior cognitu putaretur*<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>13</sup>Indeed, Professor Anderson assures me that this is not the case with his Outline, although he also expresses his admiration for such a work as the *Institutes of Quintilian*.

<sup>14</sup>Charles S. Baldwin, *College Composition*, 135 (New York, Longmans, 1928) does, indeed, cite the traditional parts of an argumentative speech, giving the Latin names, according to Quintilian, in a note. Francis P. Donnelly, *Persuasive Speech* (see note 1a, above), naturally devotes much space (73-199) to the parts of the speech and a discussion of each part.

<sup>15</sup>Compare the words of the Auctor ad Herennium (1.1): *si te unum illud monuerimus, artem sine adsiduitate dicendi non multum iuvare*....

tur<sup>16</sup>. Surely it is worth while to preserve a conscious sense of the tradition behind all modern knowledge, but all teachers, and especially teachers of the Classics, should realize that their tradition should not be allowed to become static, and thus remote from the present, but must adapt itself, must, in a word, be alive.

ALLEGHENY COLLEGE,  
MEADVILLE, PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN L. HELLER

### GEORGE GROTE AND HIS HISTORY OF GREECE<sup>1</sup>

It is only a little over sixty years since George Grote, historian of Greece, was laid to rest in Poets' Corner of Westminster Abbey. The bewildering rush of events since 1871 has caused most of us, even the historians, to forget a great many things about the London banker and sometime Radical member of the British House of Commons who wrote the first really important history of Greece (in any language!). Grote deserves more than a few paragraphs in any account of scholarship in nineteenth-century England, and a careful biography would not be an excessive tribute to his achievements.

George Grote was born at Clay Hill, near Beckenham in Kent, in 1794. His early education was acquired at the Charterhouse School, where the headmaster was a Dr. Matthew Raine. George Waddington, later Dean of Durham, and Connop Thirlwall, who himself wrote a fine history of Greece, were among young Grote's schoolmates and especial friends at this time. The attachments formed at Charterhouse continued for many years thereafter.

Nevertheless, in spite of these favorable beginnings, there were few indications that the Grote family would include a historian among its members. Grote's grandfather and his father were business men who conducted a banking house near the Royal Exchange in London. When George was sixteen, his father considered it advisable to install him in the banking house rather than to incur the expense of a College education for him. The formal education of George Grote was therefore terminated in 1810, and whatever scholarly progress he was to make in the future would be the product of his own diligence.

It may be said that in all probability the next ten years constituted the most important decade in Grote's life. Throughout this period powerful influences were at work molding his character. Extremely sensitive and impressionable, Grote could not resist being vitally affected by the contacts which he made between the years 1810 and 1820.

The future historian's acquaintance with Charles Cameron, son of the Ex-Governor of the Bahamas, was productive of the first change in his character. Previous to meeting Cameron, Grote had been accustomed to associate a great deal with George Norman, son of a

<sup>16</sup>The reader will be glad to learn that in the latest anthology of Latin prose and verse for use in College courses portions of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* have happily been rescued from the oblivion to which they are usually consigned. See Professor Dean P. Lockwood, *A Survey of Classical Roman Literature*, 1.152-160 (New York, Prentice-Hall, 1934). Professor Lockwood likewise calls attention to this sentence in his Preface, xii.

<sup>1</sup>This paper was read at the Twenty-eighth Annual Meeting of The Classical Association of the Atlantic States, held at Lafayette College, Easton, Pennsylvania, April 26-27, 1935.

well-to-do merchant, who had tastes similar to Grote's own. Together they had investigated subjects of a political and historical nature; they had been especially concerned with what was then the new science of political economy. Norman also encouraged Grote in the writing of poetry, something at which Grote seems to have been proficient in those days. Cameron, however, was a law student with a flair for metaphysics, and it was from him that Grote derived the beginnings of his life-long interest in that branch of philosophy. Brilliant, physically attractive, Cameron with his lawyer's persuasiveness literally compelled the somewhat younger Grote to follow him.

Strangely enough, the study of political economy which Grote had earlier cultivated was to bring another and greater influence into his life. Among the political economists of that day was David Ricardo, whose works Grote had read, and whom he was to meet in 1817. At Ricardo's house two years later Grote was introduced to James Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill. James Mill was then himself one of the outstanding authorities on political economy. He was unquestionably a profound thinker, and he was well versed in metaphysics. In a short time he established his ascendancy over Grote, and the latter became thoroughly imbued with his doctrine. Mill was, of course, a Benthamite, and soon brought his young disciple to be presented to the venerable Jeremy.

So it was, then, that George Grote, the banker's son, was transformed into George Grote, the radical. How he became George Grote, the historian, is yet another story. Naturally the results of his interest in political economy and metaphysics along with the teachings of James Mill were to be incorporated in Grote's historical writings, but the real reasons for the composition of the *History of Greece* have been misinterpreted in recent years. It is not difficult to produce convincing evidence on this point.

Grote had one faithful and sympathetic biographer, his wife. Endowed with a certain literary ability of her own, Mrs. Grote has left a very charming account of the historian's life. It is such a natural and unaffected bit of writing that it conveys everything clearly to the reader and does not leave a heroic mist about its subject, as biographies so often do. Grote stands out sharply defined in a portrait drawn from life.<sup>18</sup>

Mrs. Grote particularly emphasizes the historian's love of study. She illustrates this point with extracts from the diary which Grote kept during the two years preceding their marriage (1818-1820)<sup>2</sup>. From these we see that four to five hours a day outside of banking hours Grote spent in the study of political economy, history, or some kindred subject.

The interest in the Classics which Grote had acquired at the Charterhouse School seemed to increase as time went on. Dr. Raine had given his pupil an excellent foundation in Greek and in Latin, and George continued to read his classical authors at every opportunity even after he was forced to enter the business world. His letters abound in Greek and Latin quota-

tions. It is significant to find in a letter<sup>3</sup> to George Norman in 1823 the well-known words of Epicharmus, *Νῆφε, καὶ μέμνησ' ἀπιστεῖν. ἀρῶρα τὰτα τῶν φρένων*, 'Be sober, and be incredulous, for these <sobriety and incredulity> are the joints of the mind'.

Grote's studiousness and his training in the Classics were necessary prerequisites for his great work, the *History of Greece*. Alexander Bain suggests an additional element when he says<sup>4</sup>, "Mr. Grote possessed that essential quality of a historian—the historical or narrative interest. In school days he devoured novels; in later life the place of these was taken by histories and biographies relating to every nation and time".

In 1826 Grote was encouraged to write an article for the *Westminster Review* in criticism of Mitford's *History of Greece*. He clearly demonstrated that Mitford's interpretation of the Athenian democracy was based upon imperfect knowledge of the sources, and, as a result, far from correct. He severely censured the historical blunders of the work, at the same time criticizing English scholars for blindly following Mitford without making independent investigations in the field of Greek history. He denounced those who taught Greek simply as a language and made no real study of the literature.

Grote's review aroused widespread interest in British academic circles, and from this time on he was recognized as an authority on Greek history. Grote justly merited this distinction since his criticisms of Mitford were based on several years of intensive study, and for three years he had been collecting notes for his own *History*.

From 1833 to 1841 Grote's participation in politics occupied all his attention. After his retirement from public life, however, he began the composition of his greatest work, the well-known *History of Greece*. The first volume appeared in 1846, and the twelfth was published ten years later.

Mahaffy has said that Grote's *History of Greece* was "a political pamphlet" in twelve volumes<sup>5</sup>. The "political pamphlet" theory has been emphasized much too strongly in connection with Grote's work. When Grote wrote the *History*, he had definitely given up his political aspirations and no longer took an active interest in party strife. His experience in Parliament had taken away his early enthusiasm, and, although he did not change his views, the old issues did not seem as vital as they had seemed to him in his youth.

It should also be borne in mind that there were two distinct interests in Grote's life, one concerned with the present, the other with the past. The first hinged upon that which Mill had to offer, the second upon Grote's own character as a student of the Classics. Although Grote's radicalism at times seemed to mingle with his philhellenism, it never reached the point of saturation, as some of the modern historiographers would have us believe. Grote's desire to produce a truly reliable his-

<sup>18</sup>*Ibidem*, 42.

<sup>2</sup>Alexander Bain, *Minor Works of George Grote*, 67 (London, John Murray, 1873).

<sup>3</sup>See John Pentland Mahaffy, in the Introduction to M. M. Ripley's translation of Victor Duruy, *History of Greece*, 1.9 (Boston, Estes and Lauriat, 1890).

<sup>18</sup>Mrs. George Grote, *Personal Life of George Grote* (London, John Murray, 1873).

<sup>2</sup>*Ibidem*, 28-37.

tory of Greece sprang from his long-fostered love of classical antiquity. It may be observed that few of Grote's contemporaries thought of the History as a political treatise.

The History of Greece was undoubtedly Grote's best effort in the field of scholarship. Contemporary reviews show that the History excited the most favorable comments among scholars in England and on the continent. As Thirlwall said, Grote was "the man to write a history of Greece"<sup>6</sup>. Mill remarked that hardly a fact of importance in Greek history was perfectly understood before Grote's reexamination of it<sup>7</sup>. Edward A. Freeman, usually so hard to please, said that "the reading of Grote was an epoch in a man's life"<sup>8</sup>. In a review in 1856 he stated, "Mr. Grote is, to our mind, greatest as the historian of the Athenian Democracy"<sup>9</sup>.

Modern critics have held divergent opinions of Grote. Few, however, who have read Grote's History would agree with the unsympathetic Mr. C. F. Adams, who says<sup>10</sup>,

"Grote was erudite, but he wrote in accordance with his political affinities, and what is called the spirit of the time and place; and that time and place were not Greece, nor the third and fourth centuries before Christ. He had, moreover, no sense of literary form, for he put what he knew into twelve volumes, when human patience did not suffice for six.

If Mr. Adam's patience *had* sufficed for the last six volumes, he would have discovered that Grote's History is mainly concerned with Greece in the fourth and the fifth centuries B.C., and does not pretend to cover in any detail the third century B.C.

Mr. Gooch, on the other hand, seems very favorably inclined toward Grote's work. He cites the History as one of the great historical books of the world, and says, "few works make such an impression of intellectual power"<sup>11</sup>.

Grote was a pioneer in the really scientific study of Greek history. He had, for his evidence, mostly literary works. The great discoveries of Schliemann and Evans which have given us to-day such an insight into the prehistory of Greece did not come until after Grote's time. Papyrology was an unknown science. The Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum was available, but Grote used it sparingly. That important work of Aristotle, the Constitution of the Athenians, was as yet undiscovered<sup>12</sup>.

Nevertheless, Grote produced a great historical work which may very well be compared with Gibbon's Decline and Fall. He was, without doubt, a thorough scholar. He had a wide range of information based upon years of study and preparation. Few historians of Greece have ever had so complete a knowledge of the literary sources as Grote possessed. His personal experience in politics gave him greater insight into the

workings of the Athenian democracy than would have been possible for a man who had spent his life in purely academic pursuits. Grote's main weakness appears in connection with minute grammatical points. There he often made mistakes. He was quickly corrected by certain teachers of grammar who were overjoyed at finding cause for criticism.

Grote's History is still the finest history of Greece in the English language, even though many portions of the work are now in conflict with recent discoveries. His valuable contribution to the study of the Homeric Question will always be remembered as a high point in the history of scholarship. Bain designates the chapters at the beginning of the third volume of the History which deal with the evolution of the Greek governmental organization as a great contribution to political philosophy<sup>13</sup>. The closing chapters in the eighth volume, on Socrates and the Sophists, should be read by all students of Greek literature and history.

A new history of Greece based upon the original work of Grote with supplementary chapters on the Minoan Age and the Mycenaean Age and complete with copious notes, plus an up-to-date bibliography, would prove of great assistance to all who are engaged in the study of Greek history. There is a very definite need for a history of this sort to-day, a history written in the English language and available not only to students, but also to teachers. If such a project as has been here suggested could be carried out, Grote's work would soon regain its preeminent position among the great histories of Greece, and Grote himself would once more bear the title of "τὸν μέγαν Ἀγγλον ἱστοριογράφον Γεώργιον Γρότε <sic>"<sup>14</sup>.

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

TOM B. JONES

#### ON THE USE OF ICE AND SNOW FOR COOLING DRINKS

The earliest literary reference to the use of snow for cooling drinks seems to be in the fable entitled The Choice of Hercules, which is ascribed to Prodicus<sup>1</sup>; but the casual nature of the allusion to the man 'running to and fro in search of snow in summer to give zest to drinking' indicates that the custom was nothing new. This is further shown by the existence of a small class of Athenian black-figured *ψυκτήρες* from the sixth century B.C. These are double-walled vessels; the inner compartment, into which the neck opens, was for the wine, while the outer compartment, which entirely surrounds the inner, was for the snow chilled water. This water could be poured in through an opening on one side at the top and drained through a smaller opening at the bottom<sup>2</sup>. While this particular form of cooling vessel does not seem to have remained in use into the

<sup>6</sup>G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*, 317 (Longmans, 1913).

<sup>7</sup>Bain (as cited in note 4, above), 70.

<sup>8</sup>Gooch (as cited in note 6, above), 317.

<sup>9</sup>Edward A. Freeman, *Historical Essays*, Second Series<sup>2</sup>, 126 (London, Macmillan, 1880).

<sup>10</sup>C. F. Adams, *The Sifted Grain and the Grain Sifters*, American Historical Review 6 (1901), 217. <sup>11</sup>Gooch, 317.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibidem*, 318. Gooch makes the misstatement that the Politics was unknown to Grote. He no doubt means the Constitution of the Athenians, which was not found until 1891.

<sup>13</sup>Bain (as cited in note 4, above), 81.

<sup>14</sup>E. A. Freeman, in his *Historical Essays*, Second Series, 162, quotes these Greek words from lectures by Professor Constantine Paparrigopoulos.

<sup>1</sup>Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.1.30.

<sup>2</sup>George Karo, *Notes on Amasis and Ionic Black-figured Pottery*, The Journal of Hellenic Studies 19.141, and the article *Psyktēr*, in Daremberg et Saglio, *Dictionnaire des Antiquités Grecques et Romaines*, 4.750 (compare 1.821, Figure 1026).

fifth century, other forms developed, and the name *ψυκτήρ* continues to occur<sup>3</sup>. The Greeks not only used snow in this way to chill wine or water indirectly; they also drank melted snow, and mixed snow directly with wine<sup>4</sup>.

Among the Romans there were various ways of cooling wine or water with snow. The commonest method seems to have been to use a strainer of metal or cloth. The snow was placed in this, and the wine poured through it<sup>5</sup>. Thus at one process the wine was strained and cooled, and any foreign matter in the snow was kept from the wine. Sometimes, however, the snow was placed directly in the wine<sup>6</sup>; sometimes both methods seemed to have been employed in succession to insure greater chill<sup>7</sup>. Usually it is impossible to tell which method was employed<sup>8</sup>.

Water for drinking, or for adding to wine, could be chilled in either of the ways described, but might acquire an unpleasant taste from impurities in the snow<sup>9</sup>. While there seems to have been no fear of drinking wine or water in which some snow had been dissolved, we do find that it was regarded as dangerous to drink melted snow alone<sup>10</sup>. A method was accordingly invented, or rather reinvented, for chilling water without its coming into contact with the snow. This water could then be used for drinking or for diluting the wine. Such water is regularly referred to as 'boiled down water', *aqua decocta*, *aqua cocta*, or, simply, *decocta*<sup>11</sup>. Pliny the Elder<sup>12</sup> explains as follows:

... Neronis principis inventum est decoquere aquam vitroque demissam in nivis refrigerare. Ita voluptas frigoris contingit sine vitiiis nivis. Omnem utique decoctam utiliore esse convenit, item calefactam magis refrigerari, subtilissimo invento. . . .

What is new in this *Neronis decocta*<sup>13</sup> must be the use of boiled water, since the method of cooling is identical with that employed by the later types of Greek *ψυκτήρ*<sup>14</sup>.

There is little evidence as to the gathering, preservation, and marketing of snow. It must have been an extensive business, since snow was used not only for cooling drinks, but also for cooling pools in the baths<sup>15</sup>, and for chilling water for hand-washing<sup>16</sup>. We read that Alexander the Great at the siege of Petra in India dug thirty large trenches, filled them with snow, and covered them with oak branches<sup>17</sup>. The use of trenches or pits probably was regular, although I have found no other direct reference to it. Chaff or straw was used in

Roman times for covering the snow<sup>18</sup>. The use of rough cloth was probably limited to insulating small amounts of snow, possibly during transportation<sup>19</sup>. About the source of supply, the methods of delivery, and the cost, we know very little. Martial suggests that the cost of cold water (*aqua decocta*) might be greater than that of the wine with which it was mixed<sup>20</sup>.

Thus far I have spoken of the material as 'snow' rather than as 'ice'. I have found only four references in classical Latin to the use of ice for cooling water or wine<sup>21</sup>. It is certain, however, from the nature of the case as well as from these few references, that ice was also in use. It seems to have been obtained from snow rather than cut from ponds. If snow is packed hard (*shipare*<sup>22</sup>) into pits or trenches, covered with straw, and left for months in fairly warm weather, the snow near the top will melt, and the water from this, running down toward the bottom, will again congeal, changing the lower snow, already partly solidified by the packing and the weight of the mass above, into what, both in appearance and in composition, is more like ice than snow. The process is not unlike that by which the ice of a glacier is formed, but naturally is not carried so far. That such snow ice was in use is clear from Seneca, who speaks of men who are not contented with snow but require ice from the bottom of the pits; he then laments the fact that water has varying prices (i.e. that ice costs more than snow. He has previously complained that men buy water in the form of snow when water is the cheapest of all things); and finally wonders what the Spartans would have thought of this business of putting up snow<sup>23</sup>. It is clear, then, that both snow and ice were the product of the same industry, and that both were usually called snow unless there was reason to distinguish between them.

BROWN UNIVERSITY

RUSSEL M. GEER

## REVIEW

ΙΠΩΤΟΣ ΕΤΡΕΤΗΣ: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Einer Fragestellung. Von Adolf Kleingünther. Philologus, Supplementband XXVI, Heft I (Leipzig, Dieterich, 1933). Pp. 155.

In a thoroughly scholarly manner Dr. Kleingünther has, in his dissertation, . . . Untersuchungen zur Geschichte einer Fragestellung, examined Greek literature to discover the first evidences of an interest in inventors and to characterize the nature of that interest, in its

<sup>3</sup>Plato, Symposium 213 E; Alexis, Dioxippus, and Menander, in Athenaeus 11.108 (502 d-e).

<sup>4</sup>Alexis, Dextrates, Euthycles, and Strattis, in Athenaeus 3.97-98 (123 f-124 d).

<sup>5</sup>Martial 14.103 colum nivarium, 14.104 saccus nivarius. Three *cola* are illustrated in Daremberg et Saglio (see note 2, above), 1.1332, Figures 1730-1732.

<sup>6</sup>Martial 5.64.2. <sup>7</sup>Seneca, Quaestiones Naturales 4.13.9.

<sup>8</sup>See e.g. Martial 9.23.8, 9.90.5.

<sup>9</sup>Seneca, Quaestiones Naturales 4.13.8; Martial 14.117.

<sup>10</sup>Gellius 19.5, quoting Aristotle (Fragment 214, Rose); Macrobius 7.12.24-27.

<sup>11</sup>See e.g. Martial 2.85.1, 114.116.2; Juvenal 5.50; Suetonius, Nero 48.3.

<sup>12</sup>Pliny, Historia Naturalis 31.40. Compare 19.55. For the idea that heated water can be more readily cooled compare Aristotle, Meteorologica 1.12 (348 b).

<sup>13</sup>Suetonius, Nero 48.3.

<sup>14</sup>Compare the article *Psyker* in Daremberg et Saglio (see note 2, above).

<sup>15</sup>Suetonius, Nero 27.2; Seneca, Quaestiones Naturales 4.13.10.

<sup>16</sup>Petronius 31.3.

<sup>17</sup>Chares, History of Alexander, in Athenaeus 3.97 (124 c).

<sup>18</sup>Seneca, Quaestiones Naturales 4.13.8; Plutarch, Quaestiones Conviviales 6.6; St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei 21.4.

<sup>19</sup>Plutarch, Quaestiones Conviviales 6.6.

<sup>20</sup>Martial 14.116, 118. But the wines mentioned in these passages are cheap wines.

<sup>21</sup>Seneca, Epistulae Morales 78.23, Quaestiones Naturales 4.13.7; Pliny, Historia Naturalis, 19.55; Martial 9.90.5. To these might be added from the late fourth and fifth centuries Latinus Pacatus, Panegyrici Veteres 12 (2).14.1; Paulinus Petricordiae, Vita S. Martini Episcopi 3.111.

<sup>22</sup>Seneca, Quaestiones Naturales 4.13.2.

<sup>23</sup>Seneca, Quaestiones Naturales 4.13.7-8. Inde est, inquit, n. quod nec nive contenti sunt, sed glaciem, velut certior illi solido rigor sit, exquirunt, ac saepe repetitis aquis diluunt, quae non e summo tollitur, sed, ut vim maiorem habeat, et pertinacius frigus, ex abdito effoditur. Itaque ne unum quidem est pretium, sed habet in-stitores aqua, et annonam, pro pudor, variam. Unguentarios Lacedaemonii urbe expulerunt, et prope cedere finibus suis iusserunt, quia oleum disperderent. Quid illi fecissent, si vidissent reponendae nivis officinas, et tot iumenta portandae aquae deservientia, cuius colorem saporemque paleis, quibus custodiunt, inquinant?

historical development until the beginning of the fourth century B. C., when it culminated in a literary type, embodied in the treatises 'On Inventions'.

After an Introduction (1-3) there are five chapters. These deal (1) with the possibility of the search for inventors in a period that was predominantly religious, as that search was carried on (a) in the old cult-religion (5-9), (b) in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* (9-11), and (c) in Hesiod (11-16), (2) with the origin of the search for inventors (17-39), (3) with the search for inventors in the older historiography (40-65), (4) with the continuation of the 'religious' spirit in the development, in the fifth century, of the inquiry about inventors (66-94), and (5) "Die Frage nach dem ΠΡΩΤΟΣ ΕΤΡΕΤΗΣ im hauptsächlich durch die Sophistik bestimmten Zeitalter" (95-151). Finally there are an Index (152-153), and a table of citations that are made in the dissertation from the Greek writers (154-155).

Dr. Kleingünther has discovered that the first traces of an inclination on the part of the Greeks to consider the question of origins, e. g. of the arts, are to be found when human activities, especially the arts, were connected with the deities, i. e. when various gods and goddesses were considered the 'inventors' of the arts of which they were already known as the patrons. This tendency appears neither in old cult-religion nor in Homer. Even Hesiod's account of the theft of fire and his creation of Pandora were inspired not by an interest in origins for their own sake, but by a desire to explain the reason for the misery of life. A special interest in inventors is noticeable first in post-Hesiodic poetry, and is attendant upon an increase in the importance of the individual and a period of economic development (the seventh and the sixth centuries) when many inventions and innovations were actually made. The first important step in the search for origins was taken when particular objects as well as arts in general were considered as inventions, and therefore the work of divinities. Even contemporary inventions were ascribed to a divine 'inventor', because a human inventor was not yet quite conceivable. A recital of the inventions of a god or of a city was looked upon as a form of laudation, with the result that local patriotism caused a rapid increase in the number of such 'inventions'.

The next phase in the development came when Xenophanes contradicted the accepted belief that everything came from the gods, and, with the rationalism born of experience with foreign peoples and with the breadth of mental vision which characterized the sea-faring Ionians, had the courage to ascribe inventions to individual peoples or individual persons, if their right to credit for such inventions was attested by his own experience. Herodotus, true to his Ionian descent, followed Xenophanes in completely disavowing gods and heroes as creative inventors. Dr. Kleingünther is slightly in error, however, in his statement (49) that inventions are ascribed to individuals by name only in the first book of Herodotus. In 2.177 Herodotus ascribes to Amasis, King of Egypt, the first conception of a law which Solon later introduced into Athens, in 4.35 he names Olen as composer of the most ancient hymns sung at Delos,

and in 6.127 he credits Pheidon with the invention of weights and measures.

In the fifth century the scientific spirit was less dominant. In Athens, Aeschylus maintained the earlier conception of the unity of the phenomena of human life and their divine origin. Inventions in themselves had no interest for Aeschylus. The two lists of inventions which he claims for Prometheus and Palamedes in the tragedies that bear their names he introduced for their dramatic significance only. Dr. Kleingünther rightly concludes that Aeschylus, starting from the purely Attic conception of Prometheus as a culture-hero, was the first writer (perhaps, also, the only writer) to ascribe to the Titan the invention of all the arts of civilization. He has failed, however, to note an important contribution to this subject made by Professor Charles B. Gulick (*The Attic Prometheus*, in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 10 [1899], 103-114), namely, that the *Prometheus* was written in the third decade of the fifth century, when, after the expulsion of the Medes, the Athenians were restoring altars and temples and reorganizing cults. At this time the cults of Athena, Hephaestus, and Prometheus were united, with the result that Prometheus was raised to a prominence which he had not previously enjoyed. Aeschylus's *Prometheus* was in part, therefore, a propaganda play intended to aid in popularizing the new cult. For this reason the Attic hero was represented as the culture-bringer and those specific inventions were attributed to him which might naturally be thought of in view of the recent union of his cult with the cults of Athena and Hephaestus.

Sophocles, like Aeschylus, gave expression to the growing culture-consciousness of the time, but it is not quite true, as Dr. Kleingünther asserts (90-91), that he treats inventions only in the *Triptolemus*, the *Nauplius*, and the *Palamedes*. In the *Oedipus Coloneus* (715) Poseidon is praised for having been the first to use the bit and the oar. Surely the famous passage in the *Antigone* (331-360), in which man is praised for the skill with which he has domesticated animals, devised language, created states, and made himself complete master of his environment should be considered in this connection. Euripides, unlike Aeschylus and Sophocles, mentioned inventions frequently, apparently because he had an interest in them for their own sake. Dr. Kleingünther's statement (91) that Euripides named only Attic inventions and inventors is a little too sweeping. The tradition that cymbals were invented by Rhea and Dionysus (*Bacchae* 60) or by Corybantes (*Bacchae* 124), and the flute by Olympus (*Iphigenia in Aulide* 576) cannot be called Attic, while passages like *Suppliants* 201-210, in which god is praised for giving to men intelligence by which they produced the elements of culture, and *Fragment 288* (Nauck), in which cunning devices, schemes, and drugs are said to have been discovered by mortals, cannot be said to apply only to Attica.

A great change in the attitude toward inventors came in Athens in the sophistic period, when the Sophists, in order to break the bonds of customs which had formerly been held as absolute standards, declared that the laws had not been given by the gods, but had been 'invented'

by an 'inventor', and therefore might be disregarded. As a natural consequence of this doctrine inventors, who had hitherto been looked upon as benefactors of the race, might now be held in contempt. Thus two tendencies were at work in the post-Herodotean history. On the one hand, the conviction that each thing must have had an inventor aroused an increased interest in personal inventors; on the other hand the 'humanizing' of inventors tended to lessen the interest in them. The discovery that a thing was not a divine creation, but a human creation was felt to be sufficient without any attempt to determine the particular individual responsible for the invention. Investigation, turning in other directions for a new explanation of the existence of things, led to theories about the origin of inventions.

Archelaus, a student of Anaxagoras, first proposed a scientific theory of the origin of culture, which was that man and the animals were sprung from the same beginnings, and that culture begins to appear with the species 'man'. The next step was to determine the reason why man turned to the discovery of culture. Two answers were given, (1) that necessity inspired the invention of the essentials, and (2) that superabundance produced the arts and the luxuries. Prodicus, in his attempt to explain the origin of religion, conjectured that out of the worship of nature in her beneficial phases (e. g. fire, wine, grain were worshipped as Hephaestus, Dionysus, Demeter) arose the feeling that all inventors of useful things should be deified. Here is 'Euhemerism' before Euhemerus. For Prodicus and Democritus religion itself was not an invention. According to Critias, religion, like the State and the law, was the work of a lawmaker who postulated divine beings with enhanced powers of hearing, seeing, and knowing, through fear of whom men might be restrained not only from open but also from secret crime.

All the other literature of the sophistic period (comedy, rhetoric, historiography, histories of literature, and music) reveals a lively interest in inventors. Two elements in that period account for the popularity of catalogues of inventions which have been included in other works, and of special works 'On Inventions', which began to appear early in the fourth century. These elements were the enthusiasm for cultural history and the craze for systematizing traditional knowledge. The absence of the chronological element in the catalogues indicates that the interest in cultural history was second to that in systematizing knowledge. Dr. Kleingünther might have added that the arrangement of the catalogues in alphabetical or topical order substantiates this view<sup>1</sup>.

In conclusion Dr. Kleingünther treats, very briefly (146-151), five writers of special treatises 'On Inventions'. Since he definitely stated at the beginning of his dissertation (3) that he intended to treat the question of inventions only up to the fourth century, one is a little surprised that he chooses for discussion a few of the writers 'On Inventions' without indicating at all that there were others, or at least referring to such excellent works on the subject as Christopher Bruskern, *De Rerum Inventarum Scriptoribus Graecis* (Bonn, 1864) or Paul Eichholz, *De Scriptoribus ΠΕΡΙ ΕΤΦΗΜΑΤΩΝ* (Halle, 1867). But, in spite of these few errors, the absence of a bibliography, and one or two typographical slips, the book is a thoughtful and thorough presentation of the causes of ancient concern with an important question.

NORTH CENTRAL COLLEGE,  
NAPERVILLE, ILLINOIS

MARIAN HARMAN

<sup>1</sup>See Julius Kremmer, *De Catalogis Heurematum* 17 (Leipzig, Frohmann'sche Buchdruckerei, 1890).